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Abstract
A large number of mission critical applications
ranging from disaster management to smart city are
built on the Internet of Things (IoT) platform by
deploying a number of smart sensors in a heterogeneous
environment. The key requirements of such applications
are the need of near real-time stream data processing in
large scale sensing networks. This trend gives birth of
an area called big data stream. One of the key problems
in big data stream is to ensure the end-to-end security.
To address this challenge, we proposed Dynamic Prime
Number Based Security Verification (DPBSV) and
Dynamic Key Length Based Security Framework
(DLSeF) methods for big data streams based on the
shared key derived from synchronized prime numbers in
our earlier works. One of the major shortcomings of
these methods is that they assume synchronization of the
shared key. However, the assumption does not hold
when the communication between Data Stream
Manager (DSM) and sensing devices is broken. To
address this problem, this paper proposes an adaptive
technique to synchronize the shared key without
communication between sensing devices and DSM,
where sensing devices obtain the shared key reinitialization properties from its neighbours.
Theoretical analyses and experimental results show that
the proposed technique can be integrated with our
DPBSV and DLSeF methods without degrading the
performance and efficiency. We observed that the
proposed synchronization method also strengthens the
security of the models.

1. Introduction
There are a large number of critical applications,
such as large-scale sensor networks for environment
sensing, disaster management, remote health
monitoring and smart homes, that require near real-time
data stream to be processed in datacentres for enabling
data-driven decisions. These applications produce high
volume, velocity data that should be processed in nearreal time to detect events such as heart-attacks in the
context of remote health monitoring and telephony
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frauds in the context of telecommunication. These
applications require a paradigm shift as compared to
traditional store and process later approaches [1].
Clearly, traditional approaches cannot support near realtime decision making. To address this near real-time
decision making requirement, a new cloud-based
computing paradigm based on Stream Processing
Engines (SPEs) has evolved [4, 17, 18]. SPEs can
process the data stream on the fly [15, 16] in contrast to
store and process later approaches enabled by batch
processing engines such as Apache Hadoop and
Amazon Elastic MapReduce. The need of real-time
processing for high volume and high velocity input data
arises due to the need of real time detection of events in
combination with the fact that the data cannot be
persisted for later analysis for practical reasons (e.g.,
data storage overhead) [12]. SPEs can process data in
near real-time, but they have security limitations as
discussed next. In addition, Data Stream Manager
(DSM) undertakes the security verification of the data
blocks on-the-fly before SPEs. These features present
significant opportunities and challenges in the area of
data security and freshness of big data stream [11, 12].
Let us consider a Disaster Management (DM)
application to motivate the end-to-end (i.e., from
Sensing Devices to Cloud Data Centre processing layer)
security problem that exists with the current generation
of SPEs and relevant stream processing algorithmic
approaches. DM applications rely on near real-time
processing of sensor data in the cloud. Efficiency and
effectiveness of decision making and event (e.g.,
flooding, tsunami, landslides etc.) detection in DM
applications is dependent on the following security
related properties of the sensor data including
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and freshness.
Any compromise on the above mentioned security
related properties of data during processing and/or
transmission will lead to inaccurate event detection and
decision making. Ultimately this leads to the loss of
lives and critical infrastructures. Hence, these
applications require end-to-end security to increase the
reliability of the data analysis pipelines.
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StreamShield is a stream centric architecture for
security and privacy in data stream environments, where
authors highlighted the requirement of security in data
stream for the very first time [2]. Authors broadly
divided the security issues in two parts (i.e. data security
and query security) and both these security issues were
applied for stream data analysis. Following this
architecture, we identify four important requirements
and properties for security verification of big data
stream: (a) near real-time security verification, (b)
dealing with high volume and velocity of data, (c) the
data items should only be accessed once, and (d) the
original data are not available for comparisons [11, 12,
13, 14]. We focused on addressing big data stream
security requirements by keeping all these big data
stream constraints. We proposed a novel light weight
security model by ensuring end-to-end security for big
data streams. First, we proposed a Dynamic Prime
Number Based Security Verification (DPBSV) scheme
for big data stream processing, which is based on a
common shared key that is updated dynamically by
generating synchronized pairs of prime numbers [11,
12]. Later to make it more efficient and reduce the
computational overhead and buffer size, we proposed a
Dynamic Key Length Based Security Framework
(DLSeF) based on the shared key derived from
synchronized prime numbers [13, 14]. These two
techniques were proposed to maintain the end-to-end
security of big sensing data stream and perform security
verification at DSM.
All these above security solutions follow the
independent rekeying process without further
communications between the source sensors and DSM
after handshaking. However, it is impossible to continue
the key update and data transmission without any
interruptions in a hostile nature of source sensing area.
Hence, the source side key generation synchronization
is a major problem with above security solutions
(DPBSV and DLSeF). In these models, a source node
sends a request message to DSM to get the
synchronization properties if there is any kind of key
desynchronization, which is not an efficient way to get
synchronization properties. By focusing on this
problem, we propose a novel synchronization method in
this paper in which source sensors get synchronization
properties from their neighbours. As the sensing sources
are distributed in a hostile environment and nodes do not
have any neighbour/network information, it is a
challenging task to identify the authenticated neighbour
and retrieve the synchronization properties. The
contributions of the paper is summarized as follows:
• We present a synchronized shared key
generation method.
• We apply the synchronization method over
DPBSV and DLSeF security architecture.

•

We evaluate the model both theoretically and
empirically.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 details the related literature. Section 3 presents
the problem statement for key synchronization in the big
data stream based applications. Section 4 describes the
proposed synchronization method and its association
with DLSeF architecture. Section 5 presents the
theoretical analysis, and section 6 evaluates the
performance and efficiency of the method through
experiments. Section 7 concludes the paper by outlining
potential future works.

2. Related works
Ensuring the end-to-end security of big data streams
has emerged as an important research topic in many
stream processing applications such as disaster
management, telephony fraud detection and credit card
fraud detection. In this section, we describe related
works that cover the research areas such as stream
processing, and secure authentication of neighbours.
Stonebraker et al. [1] outlined eight core features
that a framework or system must possess in order to be
able to efficiently handle stream processing workloads.
These core features include (i) the continuous flow
nature of data stream, (ii) handling the data
imperfection, (iii) maintaining the data security, (iv)
integrated store and stream data, (v) partition and scale
applications automatically, (vi) query processing on
streams, (vii) expectations of query outcomes and (viii)
process and respond instantaneously. Our aim is to
ensure the data safety (iii) and availability (viii) features
of big data streams. Nehme et al. initially proposed an
architecture by addressing the needs of data security and
query security in streaming environments [2]. They
proposed a continuous access control architecture,
named StreamShield, which ensures query security.
However, StreamShield is unable to ensure end-to-end
data security of streams.
Arasu et al. proposed a Data Stream Management
System (DSMS), called STanford stREam data
Manager (STREAM) [4]. It is intended to deal with high
velocity data rates and substantial numbers of
continuous queries through adaptive resource
allocation; however, STREAM cannot ensure data
security properties. Similar to STREAM, StreamCloud
is a large scalable elastic data streaming system for
processing large data stream in cloud [3].
Sung et al. describes an identification based node
authentication, which can be used to solve key
agreement problem in a three-layer interaction of sensor
networks [8]. Authors consider the characteristics,
architecture, and vulnerability of the sensors, and
provides an ID-based node authentication scheme. An
Elliptic
Curves
Cryptography (ECC)
based
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authentication protocol has been proposed in WSN [9]
for device authentication. Khan et al. [10] showed the
M.L. Das-scheme’s security pitfalls and proposed an
improvement and security patches that attempt to fix the
susceptibilities of this scheme. Both of the above are a
secure authentication protocol but are computationally
rich, which do not follow the big data stream properties
as stated in the Introduction section. Park [24] explained
an interesting technique to get the time stamp from
neighbours for robustness to clock skews among nodes.
The neighbour is authenticated to get the
synchronization properties. In [25], a sensor classified
its neighbours based on the geographic location and
communicated to the trusted neighbours. Our network
structure is different from other network structure by
considering DSM as a centralized processor; so we need
a new solution for our model. In this paper, we propose
a new synchronization method on the above DPBSV
and DLSeF models.

3. Problem statement
Security of big sensing data stream is a major issue
for several applications including disaster management,
emergency management, event detections etc. [12]. By
considering these applications, DPBSV and DLSeF are
two security solutions proposed to maintain the end-toend security in big sensing data stream. In both of these
models, source sensor devices and DSM never
communicate between themselves after handshaking.
During handshaking process, DSM sends the key
generation properties to source sensors and the sensors
save the sensitive key generation properties in secure
module of the sensor such as TPM. The TPM is a
dedicated security chip following the Trust Computing
standard specification for cryptographic microcontroller
systems [23]. TPM provides a cost effective way of
“hardening” many recently deployed applications, those
are previously based on software encryption algorithms
with keys kept on a host’s disk [19, 23]. It provides a
hardware based trust, which contains cryptographic
functionality like key generation, store, and
management in hardware. So source sensor performs the
rekeying process independently. The above security
solutions follow these methods to satisfy the big data
stream properties (from Introduction Section). Here,
synchronization in shared key generation between the
source and DSM is a major issue and needs to be solved.
The complete architecture of data flows from source
sensing device to cloud datacenter with possible attacks
is shown in Figure 1. We refer to [8] for further
information on stream data processing in cloud.
To address these issues and make the security
solutions more efficient, we propose a novel
synchronization technique for big data stream.
Authentication of neighbour nodes to get the keys, clock

skew, and other properties are very common for wireless
sensor networks [24, 25]. We use a similar method with
minor modifications according to our network structure
to get the key synchronization properties from
neighbours. Different network structures use different
properties such as cluster head or group key or base
station information, for neighbour node authentication
[26, 27]. According to our network structure, all sources
have DSM properties along with the current time
interval. So we use these properties for neighbour
authentication. We follow the method to get the
properties from neighbours because all source sensors
use the same key in the given time interval to perform
the encryption. There are two major synchronisation
issues that need to be addressed for DPBSV and DLSeF
model: (a) time synchronization (follow particular time
to start the key generation process), and (b) the
synchronisation of the shared key when source sensor
missed the current key because of a malicious activity
or natural hazards.
As the source sensing area is distributed in nature
and the source performs the shared key generation
independently, time to start the key generation is a
challenging and important issue for security models. In
any hazardous situations, sensors may miss the shared
keys or key synchronization. Because of the TPM
properties, key generation properties remain safe in
sensors. So sensors only need the key generation
properties to restart synchronize key generation and
send data blocks to DSM.

Figure 1. Overlay architecture of sensing
device to cloud data processing center, and
possible attacks during data flow.

4. Proposed synchronization method
Our security model is motivated by the concept of
moving target defense. The basic idea is that the keys
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are the targets of attacks by attackers. To avoid such
problems in big sensing data streams, we proposed
novel techniques such as DPBSV [12] and DLSeF [14].
In these models, if an intruder/ attacker eventually hacks
the key, the data and time period is selected in such a
way that he/she cannot predict the key or its length for
the next session. In such models, there are two major
synchronisation issues that need to be addressed: (a) the
precise time to start the key generation process (time
synchronization) and (b) the synchronisation of the
shared key as discussed before. While addressing the
synchronisation issues, it is important to note that no
compromise is made on the authenticity, integrity and
partial confidentiality (maintain confidentiality in real
time) of the data, which are important to make decision
from the collected data. In this paper, we have addressed
the initial process synchronization properties with the
lost shared key synchronization over DLSeF model.

provides the notations used in modelling our method.
We next describe the proposed method.

Table 1. Notations used in our model

In this step, we assume that DSM has all deployed
sensing device’s identities (IDs) and respective secret
keys because the network is untrusted and hostile in
nature. Sensing devices and DSM implement some
common primitives such as hash function (i.e. H( )), and
common key (K1- K4), which are executed during the
initial identification and system setup steps.
The proposed authentication process follows the
DLSeF authentication phase that includes five different
steps [13, 14]. The first three steps are for the sensing
device and DSM authentication process and the final
two steps are for the session key generation process as
shown in Figure 2. The session key (Ksi) is utilized
during the handshaking process which was generated
during the system setup step.
We keep the hashing and shared key at the source
sensor to use in future for data encryption and neighbour
authentication (refer Figure 2). We are using the trusted
part of sensors (i.e. TPM) to keep the secret information
of source sensors [19].

Acronym
𝑆𝑖
Di
𝐾𝑖
𝐾𝑠𝑖
𝑘𝑙
𝐾𝑆𝐻
𝐾𝑆𝐻 −
𝑟
𝑡
𝑇
T′
T′′
𝑃𝑖
𝐾𝑑
𝐼𝐷
𝐴𝐷
𝐸( )
𝐻( )
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖 )
KeyGen
Key-Length
()
⊕
∥
RQA
RPA

Description
ith source sensing device’s ID.
DSM ID
ith source device’s secret key.
ith source device’s session key.
Key length
Secret shared key at sensor and DSM
Previous secret shared key.
Pseudo random number.
Interval time to generate the prime
number.
Timestamp added with data blocks.
Current time
Time to start the process.
Random prime number.
Secret key of the DSM.
Data for integrity check.
Secret key for authenticity check.
Encryption function.
One-way hash function.
Prime number generation function.
Key generation procedure.
Key length selection procedure.
Bitwise X-OR operation.
Concatenation operation.
Authentication request message.
Authentication response message.

Similar to DPBSV and DLSeF security solutions
[11, 12, 13, 14], we added synchronisation processes
(both time synchronization and key synchronization) to
them with the standard steps: system setup,
handshaking, rekeying, key synchronization and
security verification. We follow DLSeF system setup,
handshaking, rekeying model with minor modifications
before synchronization properties are described. Table 1

Figure 2. Secure authentication between
Sensor and DSM during system setup (from
DLSeF model [13]).

4.1. System setup

4.2. Handshaking
In the handshaking process, the DSM sends the key
generation and synchronization properties to sensors
based on their individual session key (Ksi) established
earlier during authentication process.
The dynamic prime number generation function
computes the relative prime number, which always
depends on the previous prime number [13]. It is also
already proved that the generated number will always be
prime number and synchronized between source devices
and DSM [13]. We follow DLSeF method for rekeying
time interval according to the key length.
DSM sends a time chunk, i.e., T′′ along with other
properties
i.e.
𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡, , 𝑃𝑖 ,
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𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 ( ), 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ( ), 𝐾𝑆𝐻 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛 [11, 12, 13,
14]. This time stamp (T′′ ) is used at source to initialize
the key generation process and sent the encrypted data
blocks to the DSM. If any sources missed the time stamp
to initialize the process, it will send request to DSM to
get the time stamp again. New sources joining to the
network need to follow the step to start the key
generation/ rekeying process.
Si
←
DSM:
{ 𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑖 (𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡, T ′′ , 𝑃𝑖 ,
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 ( ), 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ( ), 𝐾𝑆𝐻 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛)}
All of these above transferred information are stored
in the trusted part of source for future rekeying process
(e.g., TPM) [19].
Table 2. Time taken by symmetric key (AES)
algorithm to get all possible keys using the
most advanced Intel i7 processor.
Key Length
Key domain size
Time (in
nanoseconds)

32
4.295e+
09
7.301e+
09

64
1.845e
+19
3136e
+19

By following DLSeF model, sensors generate the
shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻=(𝐸(𝑃𝑖,𝐾𝑑)) using the prime number 𝑃𝑖,
and DSM’s secret key 𝐸(P𝑖,𝐾𝑑). We use the secret key
of DSM to improve the robustness of the security
verification process and fixed the initial key length as 64
bits. The data blocks divided into two different parts,
i.e., authentication and integrity verification. One is
encrypted DATA based on shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 for integrity
checking (i.e., 𝐼𝐷=𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻), and the other part is
for the authenticity checking (i.e., 𝐴𝐷=𝑆𝑖⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻). The
resulting data block ((DAT𝐴⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻) ∥ (𝑆𝑖⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻)) is sent
to DSM as follows:
Si → DSM: {(𝐼𝐷∥(𝐴𝐷∥T))}.
The procedure of rekeying process is shown in
Algorithm 1.

128
3.4028e
+38
5.7848e
+35

4.3. Rekeying
Our proposed method not only calculates the
dynamic prime number to update the shared key without
further communication after handshaking, but also
dynamically change the key length at sensor and DSM.
We follow the DLSeF Rekeying process to ensure that
the protocol remains secured [13]. According to the
properties of the TPM, no one have access to contents
which is stored inside the TPM. Only the corresponding
sensor can access TPM properties [19]. From the
Handshaking process, sensors are aware of the Prime
(Pi), KeyLength, and KeyGen. Now we describe the
complete rekeying process by using those functions and
keys from DLSeF model. The synchronized dynamic
prime number Pi is generated on both ends, i.e., sensors
and DSM [13], to be used for the rekeying process. Now
sensors need to wait for the time T′′ to start the key
generation process.
ALGORITHM 1. Key Generation (Rekeying) Process
1. Dynamic prime number Prime (𝑃𝑖 ) [13].
2. Following DLSeF method [13]:
2.1 t (time interval) = {t1, t2, t3, …}
Here t1, t2, t3, … are the time interval for
rekeying. (32/64/128-bit key from DLSeF)
2.2 At time (t), 𝑆𝑖 and D compute 𝐾𝑆𝐻=
𝐸𝐾𝑆𝐻 (H(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐾𝑑 )).
2.3 After time (t), reinitialize from Step 1.
3. The encryption process at sensor as follows
3.1 𝐼𝐷 =𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻 // For integrity check
3.2 𝐴𝐷 =𝑆𝑖 ⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻
// For Authentication check
4. Si → DSM: {(ID ∥(AD ∥T))}// Data format to DSM

Figure 3. Neighbour node discover to get the
current state of key generation properties.

Figure 4. Neighbour discovery to get the key
synchronization properties with all possible
conditions. (a) node Si sends RQA message to
all its one-hop neighbours; (b) the sender
receives the RPA of individual RQA; (c) Si send
ACK to only authenticated synchronized
neighbours; (d) node Si receives the
synchronization properties.

4.4. Key synchronization
Synchronization is one of the major issues during the
rekeying process between sensors and DSM, as they are
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not interacting after handshaking process. The shared
key synchronization is based on the initial key
generation process followed by the rekeying. So the
initial key synchronization is to make a common time to
start the key generation process. In our model, DSM
works as a centralize controller. So DSM initiates the
key generation process. As defined before, during the
handshaking process DSM sends back to the source (Si)
with a time stamp T′′ to initialize the key generation
process.
There are potentially two cases (i) sensor starts the
process on time to maintain synchronization; (ii) sensor
may be missing the time stamp T ′′ or later receives the
key generation properties after time stamp. In the second
case, source sensor send request to get the next time
stamp for key generation process.
There are several reasons for sensors to be out of
sync such as inability of the source node to generate the
shared key by some computational overhead or by any
natural disaster or by any malicious activity. Even if a
sensor missed the synchronization, it does not miss the
key generation properties because of the TPM features
[19]. In such cases, the source sensor (Si) gets
synchronization properties from its neighbours.
According to the source network structure, sensors do
not have neighbour information. So it’s a challenging
task to identify the neighbours and get the key
synchronization properties. The procedure to obtain
shared key properties from unknown neighbours is
given below.
4.4.1. Initial setup. Let us assume that sensor (Si)
missed the synchronization. The Sensor (Si) computes a
Pseudo Random Number, i.e., PRN(r), using the current
prime number (Pi) and the shared key (KSH) to generate
the authentication request message (RQA) i.e. RQA ←
H(EKSH(r ∥ Pi ∥ Kd)). Then the resultant RQA, DSM ID
(Di) and time stamp (T) encrypt with mutual key K4
from the system setup steps (EK4(RQA ∥ T ∥ Di)) (refer
to Figure 2). We use this key for encryption because all
the authenticated nodes have this key from DSM during
the system setup phase.
4.4.2. Synchronization phase. The out of sync sensor
(Si) broadcasts this to its one-hop neighbours. When the
neighbour sensors receive the information, it decrypts
with its mutual key i.e. K4 (DK4(RQA ∥ T ∥ Di)). It
compares the received time frame (T) with its current
time (T′) to check the data freshness and avoid the replay
attack (T - T′ ≤ ΔT). If the time difference is less then
ΔT, then it accepts the data packet; otherwise it is
discarded. Here ΔT is the average time required to
transmit data packet between source and DSM.
The neighbour node (denoted as Sj) compares the
received DSM ID with its own DSM ID to validate the
source as the authenticated one. To make the
authentication process stronger, we perform two layer

encryption of the request (RQA). Sensor (Sj) perform
the hash and decrypt the second layer with the shared
key (KSH), i.e. H(DKSH(r ∥ Pi ∥ Kd)). It uses previous
shared key if the shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻− is modified in the
meantime and compares the DSM ID by retrieving it
using the DSM secret key (Di← retriveKey(Kd)).
After authentication process, Sj prepares
authentication response message (RPA) by including its
own ID, DSM ID and pseudo random number r (RPA ←
EKSH(Sj ∥ Di ∥ r)). It then encrypts the RPA along with
DSM key and time stamp by using the same key K4
(EK4(RPA ∥ Kd ∥ T)).
Once Si receives the RPA, it is processed in the same
way to authenticate the node Sj (DK4(RPA ∥ Kd ∥ T)).
First it compares the time to avoid replay attack (T - T′
≤ ΔT) and compares the DSM ID (Di← retriveKey(Kd))
and value of r to perform authentication. Here
desynchronized source node (Si) encounters three
different types of neighbours: malicious node,
desynchronized authenticated node and synchronized
authenticated node as shown in Figure 4. Malicious
neighbours cannot decrypt Si request because it is
encrypted by the secret key. But a desynchronized
authenticated node can read the request. Once it came to
know that the source (Si) is seeking the key
synchronization properties, it sends the response with its
desynchronization indication. The source discards the
RPA received from such nodes. If the source node
receives RPA from authenticated synchronised
neighbour, Si choses such node by sending the ACK in
order to get the key synchronization properties
(EKSH(ACK ∥ Si ∥ T)).
This acknowledgement message (i.e. ACK) confirms
the mutual authentication between the source and
synchronised neighbour to obtain the key
synchronization properties (DKSH(ACK ∥ Si ∥ T)). After
receiving the acknowledgement message, the
authenticated neighbour gets the source node ID and
sends the shared key properties (Pi, KSH, t) to source
node as EKSH(Pi, KSH, t, T).
When the desynchronized source gets the shared key
synchronization properties (DKSH(Pi, KSH, t, T)), it can
generate the shared key by itself, because it has the
prime number (Pi), shared key (KSH), and time to change
the next key (t). Every time we are checking the time
interval in order to avoid the replay and DoS attacks.
The stepwise representation of the neighbour
authentication to obtain the shared key properties is
shown in Figure 3.
4.4.3. New node synchronization. If there is a new
source node joining to the network, then it starts the
authentication process with DSM to get the key
generation properties. After receiving the key
generation properties from DSM, the node (n) either
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starts the process or authenticate with the neighbour
nodes to compare the synchronization properties.

4.5. Security verification
In this step, the DSM first checks the authenticity in
each individual data block 𝐴𝐷 and then the integrity
with the randomly selected data blocks 𝐼𝐷. Here data
block is divided into two blocks for authenticity
checking and integrity checking. Along with
authenticity checking, we add timestamp (T) in order to
get the data freshness and avoid replay attack. We
change the security verification for data integrity in
random interval of data packets according to the DLSeF
properties [13, 14]. We prefer to change the integrity
verification interval that is directly proportional to the
shared key length because the key length is inversely
proportional to the possibilities of data accessible. The
data block at DSM for security verification is
represented as: {(𝐼𝐷∥(𝐴𝐷∥T))}. DSM first checks the
authentication part to get the timestamp. It compares its
own timestamp with the received one i.e. T - T′ ≤ ΔT. If
the time interval is less than or equal to the predefined
time ΔT, then it accepts the data; otherwise it is rejected.
This will help to maintain the data freshness and avoid
the replay attack. Initial time checking and the
authenticated source checking can avoid the DoS (denial
of service) attack. Another important advantage of
adding the time stamp (T) is to get the shared key used
for the encryption process. If the shared key is updated
after receiving the data block encryption, then DSM
uses the previous shared key (𝐾𝑆𝐻− ) for decrypting the
data instead of current key (𝐾𝑆𝐻).
We are updating the shared key before the possible
attacks. For the authenticity check, the DSM decrypts
𝐴𝐷 with shared key 𝑆𝑖=𝐴𝐷⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻. Once Si is obtained,
the DSM checks its source database and extracts the
corresponding secret key 𝐾𝑖 (𝐾𝑖 ← 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝐾𝑒𝑦(𝑆𝑖 )).
In the integrity check process, the DSM decrypts the
selected data such as 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴=𝐼𝐷⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻 to get the
original data and checks MAC for the data integrity.

5. Theoretical analysis
This section provides a theoretical analysis of our
proposed model to show that the proposed
synchronization method works efficiently by getting the
shared key properties from the neighbours. We also
apply the synchronization properties over DPBSV and
DLSF and prove that the models are safe against the
network attacks. Proposed synchronization method
never interrupt the shared key generation at sensors.
We have made a number of practical and realistic
assumption in our method. In the following, we first
describe those assumptions.

Assumption 1. In our method, the data that was
encrypted by a symmetric-key algorithm cannot be
decrypted by any parties, unless they have the
session/shared key.
Assumption 2. Shared key (KSH) calculation
procedures reside inside trusted parts of the sensor (like
TPM) so that no one is authorized to access and
manipulate them [12].
We define our threat model, which is similar to the
most cryptologic analyses, to the shared key properties
as follows:
Theorem 1. According to the proposed synchronization
method, the shared key (KSH) is always synchronized
between Source sensor (Si) and DSM.
Proof: We are following the DLSeF security
verification
model
and
added
the
shared
synchronization properties to it. According to DLSeF
properties, the dynamic shared key length varies in 32
bit, 64 bit, and 128 bit; these keys are updated both
source and DSM ends. The shared key is updated
without further communications between Si and DSM
after handshaking. A variation in key length introduces
a complexity to the attackers to predict the next shared
key. The ECRYPT II recommendations on key length
say that a 128-bit symmetric key provides the same
strength of protection as a 3,248-bit asymmetric key.
Advanced processor (Intel i7 Processor) took about 1.7
nanoseconds to try out one key from one block. With
this speed, it would take about 1.3 × 1012× the age of
the universe to check all the keys from the possible key
set [22]. All the related key domain and the time
required to get the possible keys by using Inter i7
processor are listed in Table 2. We follow the DLSeF
model to select the key lengths [13].
Here, we are highlighting the synchronization in two
places (i) source sensor with DSM at initial key
generation process and (ii) while obtaining the
synchronization properties from neighbour. For the first
option (during the handshaking process), DSM sends
the key generation properties to Si along with the
timestamp (T′′) to set the key generation time. Then both
DSM and Si generate the shared key with dynamic
length and interval as in DLSeF method. This means the
shared key will be synchronized at both ends. In second
option (obtaining the synchronization properties from
neighbours), if any of the source desynchronized, it
initiates the neighbour authentication process to
discover authenticated synchronized neighbour (see
Figure 3). After authentication, neighbour sends the key
generation properties EKSH(Pi, KSH, t, T), where T is for
data freshness and t is the start of the key generation
process. Then source Si can use the current key and use
these properties to update the next key (i.e.
𝐾𝑆𝐻=(𝐸(𝑃𝑖,𝐾𝑑))) after time t. Now source Si became
synchronize with other sources and DSM.
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Theorem 2. After applying synchronization, security
verification models (DPBSV and DLSeF) are protected
against authentication, integrity and partially
confidentiality.
Proof: Please refer to [11, 12] for the attack
properties associated with DPBSV model and [13, 14]
with the DLSeF model. By considering TPM properties,
we know that an attacker cannot get the secret
information (Pi, Ki, KSH) or the key generation properties
(KeyGen). During the neighbourhood authentication
procss, a sensor (Si) shares the synchronization
properties after authentication and gets the DSM ID and
the secret key (see Figure 3). So there are no possibilities
for the malicious nodes to trap authenticated sensors to
get the shared key generation properties. Following
neighbour synchronization properties, malicious nodes
cannot interfere because neighbours identify each other
through the DSM ID (Kd) and the encryption process
uses the secret key (EK4). Those properties are not
known to malicious nodes. We know that an intruder
cannot get the currently used KSH within the time
interval t (see Table 2), because our proposed method
calculates Pi randomly after time interval t and then uses
the value Pi to generate KSH. But an attacker can
introduce itself as an authenticated node to send packets.
We know that DPBSV [11] and DLSeF [13] are
protected against authentication, integrity and partially
confidentiality. From above, we conclude that, an
attacker cannot get the shared key information during
neighbour synchronization. By combining the above
two we conclude that the security verification models
are safe after including the synchronization properties.
Theorem 3. After applying the synchronization, the
security verification models avoid replay attacks.
Proof: There are potentially two places for replay
attacks (i) during the neighbour authentication; (ii) the
security verification at DSM. In both of these cases we
are adding a time stamp i.e. T in packets. During the
security verification at DSM, DSM checks for the data
freshness by comparing the time interval between the
sent and received time of data blocks such as T - T′ ≤
ΔT. If the interval is less than or equal to ΔT, then the
data block is accepted; otherwise it is rejected.
Application of this rule keeps rejecting the delayed data
packets. but maintains the data freshness and avoids the
replay attacks. Through the time interval (ΔT), it is easy
for DSM to find the shared key used for encryption
(𝐾𝑆𝐻 − or KSH). We also follow the same method to avoid
replay attack during neighbour authentication. By using
such method, our model is proven to be more efficient
to avoid the DoS attacks.

6. Experiment and evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed
key synchronization method under the adverse

conditions, we validate our proposed method in a wellestablished security protocol simulation environment.
We first verify the security method using Scyther [5],
and then measure the efficiency of the same in the JCE
(Java Cryptographic Environment) [6]. Finally, we
check the performance of security aware sensor data
encryption and sensor node performance in COOJA
simulator provided by Contiki OS [7].

6.1. Security verification
The proposed method for synchronized shared key
is implemented in the Scyther simulation environment
using the Security Protocol Description Language
(.spdl). The efficacy of the proposed security is
observed for two important instances (i) during the
security verification at DSM and (ii) during neighbour
authentication process. According to the features of
Scyther, Si is the sender (i.e., source sensor), Sj is the
neighbour of Si (neighbour authentication) and D is the
recipient (i.e., DSM). Apart from these, we follow the
default properties of Scyther. Many types of
cryptographic attack can be considered in our simulation
context. In our case, we focus on integrity,
authentication, data confidentiality (in real time), and
replay attacks as discussed above. We used Scyther, an
automatic security protocols verification tool, for
verifying our model.

Figure 5. Secure authentication results.

Figure 6. Security verifications results at DSM.
Results: We did our simulation using variable
numbers of data blocks in each run. Our experiment
ranges from 10 to 100 instances with the intervals of 10.
During the neighbour authentication, both sensors Si
and Sj authenticate themselves while hiding the DSM
ID and secret key. In the experiment, we did not
encounter any attacks that can compromise the security
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properties of the big data streams. Results shown in
Figure 5 validate the above hypothesis; it also and shows
the neighbour authentication in the Scyther
environment. As stated in [13], we perform the security
verification at DSM; here, we follow the same concept
while adding the new key synchronization process.
Figure 6 shows the results of the security verification at
DSM after combining the synchronization method with
DLSeF.

Figure 7. Performance of security verification
at DSM.

6.2. Performance comparison
The performance comparison experiment is carried out
in JCE (Java Cryptographic Environment). The
performance is based on the features of JCE in java
virtual machine version 1.6 64 bit. JCE is the standard
extension to the java platform which provides a
framework implementation for cryptographic methods.
We have performed experiments with different sizes of
data blocks by applying the synchronization over
DLSeF and named as MS-DLSeF (DLSeF modified for
synchronization). We also applied the same
synchronization proprieties over DPBSV and named as
MS-DPBSV (DPBSV modified for synchronization).
The results of our experiments are shown in Figure 7.
We compare the performance of our proposed method
over DLSeF (MS-DLSeF) and DPBSV (MS- DPBSV)
with the advanced encryption standard (AES) [20, 21],
DPBSV [11, 12] and DLSeF [13, 14]. Apart from the
neighbour synchronization we follow the properties of
DPBSV and DLSeF. From Figure 7, it is clear that the
synchronization method does not degrade the
performance of DPBSV and DLSeF in terms of security
verification speed.

6.3. Sensor node performance
We experimented with the performance of the sensors
in terms of the overheads involved while computing
synchronized shared keys in COOJA simulator provided
by Contiki OS [7]. We modelled the two most common
types of sensor, i.e., Z1 and Trotsky. A Z1 sensor node

is equipped with the low power microcontroller
MSP430F2617, which features a powerful 16-bit RISC
CPU @16 MHz clock speed, built-in clock factory
calibration, 8 KB RAM and a 92 KB Flash memory.
TmoteSky is an ultra-low power sensor, and it is
equipped with the low power microcontroller
MSP430F1611, which has a built-in clock factory
calibration, a 10 KB RAM and a 48 KB Flash memory.

(a) Energy for
(b) Energy for
neighbour
security
authentication
verification
Figure 8. Energy consumption by using
COOJA in Contiki OS.
In this experiment, we measured the performance of
sensors while they transmit/receive information from
neighbours or dynamically update the shared key for
undertaking security verification process. Figure 8 (a)
shows the energy required by sensors during
transmitting/receiving synchronization properties from
neighbours and Figure 8 (b) shows the power
consumption behaviours for the key generation process.
From these experiments, we conclude that our proposed
method is lightweight as both the application of
synchronization properties and security verification
model consume very little sensor battery power.
From the above experiments, we conclude that our
proposed method is secured and efficient in term of
security verification speed.

7. Conclusion and future works
In this paper, we proposed a shared key
synchronization method to ensure an end-to-end
security in big data stream processing system consisting
of distributed sensors and cloud-hosted stream
processing
engines
(DSM).
The
proposed
synchronization technique was implemented and
verified in our previously proposed DPBSV and DLSeF
security verification method for big data streams. In
these previous models, sensors and DSM update their
shared key independently without requiring further
communication after handshaking phase. Proposed
method synchronize the shared key without
communication between sensing devices and DSM,
where sensing devices obtain the shared key reinitialization properties from its neighbours. By
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theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations, we
showed that our proposed synchronization method
successfully scales within the DPBSV and DLSeF
models. In our future work, we will implement the
proposed model in a real IoT application that requires
near real-time decision making. We will further improve
our techniques to meet the requirements of dynamic IoT
networks.

[12] D. Puthal, et al. "A Dynamic Prime Number Based
Efficient Security Mechanism for Big Sensing Data Streams."
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